sábado, 15 de marzo de 2014


  1. Although there were 2500 prosecutions for passing forged notes last year and some pounds 25m was seized, one banknote in a hundred in circulation is a fake pouds dollars euros

    but they don't forge fake banknotes von haiti or zimbabwe

    ergo makes no sense this idea

    the dollar have a fidutia value all around the world
    and is easier to have 10 thousand dollar's in bonds than the same value in copper or in silver or in scrap metal
    or in bean's you can, yes you can survive years with 10 thousand dollar's of beans
    with some side effects

    and the dollar failure is not near we pay 73 cents per dollar
    the zimbabwe dollar are selling at 50 cents for 100 trillion banknote in the local flea market
  2. pounds not pouds...and the silver or the copper market are unstable
    the dollar till now have magnetic appeal

    by definition this situation is not new but evolved to a pivoted unstable world economy where the dollar and the swiss franc and the pound and the euro
    have faith incorporated

    like the corpus christi in wine and flouR

  3. syrian, chinese, japs, charlie (vietcong, vietmihn und so weiter buy american bonds
    germans buy US of A bonds Osama bin Laden use to have american bonds

    Putin and all the people that is in a state of constant change have bonds that have been paid from records that endure at least 150 years

    i don't have a record of default in american bonds

    except this :
    The 1790 Default. Shortly after the formation of the first United States federal government under the Constitution of 1787, Congress passed and President Washington signed the Funding Act of 1790. This act directed the Secretary of the Treasury, Alexander Hamilton, to assume the Revolutionary War debts of the states, allowing creditors to exchange the state-backed war debt with bonds issued by the US Treasury. The interest on the bonds was deferred until 1801. A total of $21.5 million dollars was assumed.

    Prior to the passage of the Funding Act, much of the debt was expected to default. It traded at deep discounts to face value. Once the act was passed, the value of the debt skyrocketed—because bondholders were sure they would be repaid by the new federal government. In fact, quite a lot of money was made by people who bought the state debt in anticipation of the Funding Act or with early notice that it had passed. Even at the time of the Founding, traders were profiting from informational asymmetries.

    The Act also provided that the debt securities issued by the Confederation government that existed prior to the federal government would be converted into new federal bonds. The interest on one third of the value of the converted bonds was deferred until 1801.

    So why is this described as a default by Reinhart and Rogoff? It’s pretty clear that the federal government was not defaulting on its own obligations. Instead, it was modifying obligations incurred by the states—either directly or through the Confederation—and assuming them.

    This was almost the opposite of a default, since it made payment much more likely. That’s why the bonds rallied after the passage of the act.

    The 1841-1842 Defaults. This was actually a series of defaults by nine state governments, including three states that repudiated their debt altogether. The federal government was not involved.

    The 1873-1884 Defaults. Another series of defaults by states and cities. In total 10 states defaulted. West Virginia, the worst of the state financial basket cases, was still working out its debt with creditors by 1918. There wasn’t a federal government default, however.

    The 1933 Default. In the summer of 1933, Congress passed the “Joint Resolution to Assure Uniform Value to the Coins and Currencies of the United States” which declared invalid and provisions of obligations of the federal government which were “purported” to give the creditor the right to require repayment in gold. The Roosevelt administration wanted to depreciate the paper currency, and thought the “gold clauses” contained in various bonds were an obstacle.

    This is arguably the closest the US government came to defaulting. But this is more like monetizing debt than defaulting. It is closer to having the Federal Reserve inflate our way out of debt than what Rep. Ryan is proposing.

    So no history of defaults?

    To be fair to Reinhart and Rogoff, they don’t describe these as pure defaults—but as instances of defaults and restructuring. In this paper, they give more details on them.

    It’s just not correct to say that the US is a serial defaulter—or to imply that we can predict the consequences of a default now based on past defaults. We just don’t have any historical data to tell us what would happen.
  4. in your default we have faith that the 2020 dollar can yes they can purchase something like beans or flour
    with zimbabwe bué dollar's i'm sure they don't give me anything in return

    the dollar is a magnetic paper
    the turks in Magnesia (is a mine a greek mine now in turkey) have Ben Franklin's in their wallets

    they don't have bit con's je ne sais pas porquoi
    or zimbabwe dollar's is the same name
    like the austria taller....

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